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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. 
LIZA VICTORIA CORWELL, : Case No. 20020343-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for attempted tampering with 
evidence, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated sections 76-8-510 
and 76-4-101 (1999), and from the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. This 
Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under Utah Code Annotated section 78-2-2(3)(i) 
(Supp. 2002), which grants this Court jurisdiction over cases not involving a first degree 
or capital felony. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENTS 
1. To conduct a warrantless search based on exigent circumstances, the police 
must first have probable cause that a crime has occurred. Here, after receiving an 
anonymous tip of possible drug activity in a motel room, the police entered the room 
without conducting any meaningful, independent investigation to corroborate the 
reported criminal activity. Did the lack of corroboration and investigation prevent the 
police from obtaining probable cause? 
In reviewing whether the police had probable cause of criminal activity, this Court 
overturns factual findings for clear error and reviews the trial court's legal conclusions 
for correctness. State v. Valenzuela. 2001 UT App 332, ^ [8, 37 P.3d 260. Trial counsel 
specifically argued below that the police lacked probable cause. R. 49; 99: 19-23.l 
2. Exigent circumstances justify a warrantless search when a reasonable person 
believes that entry is necessary to prevent physical harm, the destruction of evidence, the 
escape of the suspect, or some other consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law 
enforcement efforts. After the police knocked on a motel room door in this case, they 
saw two women scurrying and tidying the room. Did these actions reasonably indicate 
that they were concealing or destroying evidence? 
In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, this Court reviews factual findings 
for clear error and legal conclusions for correctness. Valenzuela. 2001 UT App 332, [^8, 
37 P.3d 260. Trial counsel contested the exigency of the situation in a motion to suppress 
and at a subsequent hearing. R. 49; 99: 19-23.2 
The volume marked 99 contains the transcript of the hearing on the motion to 
suppress. Volume 100 contains the plea hearing transcript and volume 182 includes the 
hearing on the motion to withdraw Appellant's guilty plea. The internal page numbers of 
those volumes are included after "R.:,f and the volume number. 
2The first two issues arise in the co-defendant's case, State v. Champneys. No. 
20020123-CA, which is pending before this Court. Because both appeals raise identical 
2 
3. In accepting guilty pleas, trial judges must strictly follow Utah Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 11(e) ("Rule 11(e)") to ensure that guilty-pleading defendants knowingly and 
voluntarily waive their constitutional and statutory rights. Appellant never indicated in 
her plea statement nor did the trial judge ever address Appellant's rights to a speedy 
public trial or the limits on her right to appeal her conviction. Did the trial judge's self-
proclaimed "substantia^]" compliance with Rule 11(e) satisfy the strict compliance rule? 
This Court reviews for correctness whether trial judges have strictly complied with 
constitutional and procedural requirements when accepting a guilty plea. State v. 
Martinez, 2001 UT 12, f 14, 26 P.3d 203. Trial counsel challenged the adequacy of the 
trial judge's compliance with Rule 11(e) in a motion to withdraw Appellant's guilty plea. 
R. 84, 120. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects persons from 
unreasonable searches and seizures: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
issues, and no conflict of interest exists between these cases, appellate counsel represents 
both Ms. Champneys and Ms. Cornell on appeal. Appellate counsel has not sought to 
consolidate these appeals, however, because, unlike Ms. Champneys, Ms. Corwell 
challenges the voluntariness of her guilty plea. 
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particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
Article I, section XIV of the Utah Constitution provides similar protection against 
unreasonable searches and seizures: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures 
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized. 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e) details the requirements for trial judges to 
review in accepting guilty pleas: 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or 
guilty and mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the 
court has found: 
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she 
has knowingly waived the right to counsel and does not desire 
counsel; 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of 
innocence, the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the 
right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury, the right 
to confront and cross-examine in open court the prosecution 
witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense 
witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
(4) (A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of 
the offense to which the plea is entered, that upon trial the 
prosecution would have the burden of proving each of those 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an 
admission of all those elements; 
(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is 
sufficient if it establishes that the charged crime was actually 
committed by the defendant or, if the defendant refuses or is 
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otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution has 
sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction; 
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum 
sentence, and if applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of 
the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each offense to 
which a plea is entered, including the possibility of the 
imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion 
and plea agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for 
filing any motion to withdraw the plea; and 
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal 
is limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the 
defendant on the record or, if used, a written statement reciting 
these factors after the court has established that the defendant 
has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the 
sworn statement. If the defendant cannot understand the English 
language, it will be sufficient that the sworn statement has been 
read or translated to the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is 
not required to inquire into or advise concerning any collateral 
consequences of a plea. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On April 4, 2001, the State filed an Information charging Appellant Liza Victoria 
Corwell and Rebecca Champneys with one count each of tampering with evidence, 
unlawful possession of a controlled substance, and unlawful possession of drug 
paraphernalia. R. 2. On September 19, 2001, Ms. Corwell joined in Ms. Champneys' 
previously-filed motion to suppress the evidence that the police obtained during a 
warrantless search of their motel room based on an anonymous informant's tip. R. 49. 
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The State opposed the motion. R. 39. The trial judge denied the motion and ruled that 
probable cause and exigent circumstances supported the search. R. 63; 99: 24-26. 
On December 7, 2001, Ms. Corwell agreed to plead guilty to one count of 
attempting to tamper with evidence. R. 56. In exchange for the pleas, the State agreed to 
dismiss the remaining charges and to allow Ms. Corwell to appeal the denial of her 
motion to suppress. R. 56; 99: 2-4. The trial court accepted the guilty pleas the same 
day. R. 100: 13-14. On March 29, 2002, the trial judge suspended Ms. Corwell's 
sentence and placed her on probation for 24 months. Addendum A. Ms. Corwell filed a 
notice of appeal on April 26, 2002. R. 75. 
On April 29, 2002, Ms. Corwell filed a motion to vacate her conviction and to 
withdraw her guilty plea. R. 84. Ms. Corwell argued that she did not knowingly and 
voluntarily plead guilty because the trial judge failed to advise her of her right to a 
speedy public trial, limited appeal rights, and other requirements found in Rule 11(e). R. 
122. The State opposed the motion and argued that the trial judge substantially complied 
with Rule 11(e). R. 145-49. 
In the meantime, this Court assumed jurisdiction over this case based on the filing 
of the notice of appeal. On June 5, 2002, Ms. Corwell requested this Court to stay her 
appeal and to remand this matter to the trial court to resolve her motion to withdraw her 
guilty plea. R. 158. This Court granted Ms. Corwell's request and ordered her to inform 
this Court of the disposition of the motion and to file an amended notice of appeal, if 
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necessary. R. 156. 
The trial judge conducted a hearing on the motion on June 21, 2002. R. 182. He 
concluded that although he did not inform Ms. Cornell of all of the constitutional rights 
she had waived by pleading guilty, she understood her actions. R. 182: 5-6. The trial 
judge entered a written order denying the motion on October 11, 2002. R. 177. In it, he 
ruled that because he had "substantially" complied with "most" of Rule 1 l(e)'s 
requirements, Ms. Corwell had voluntarily entered her plea. R. 178. Ms. Corwell filed 
an amended notice of appeal on October 28, 2002. Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On March 13, 2000, a caller telephoned Salt Lake City police dispatch and stated 
that a woman named Liza Corwell was with another woman in room 236 at a motel 
located at 1990 West and North Temple Street. R. 40; 99: 3. The caller claimed that the 
two women may be selling drugs from the room. R. 3. The police dispatched several 
officers to the motel, including Detectives Troy Anderson and Tracy Ita. R. 99: 3. 
The record indicates that the police did not know the identity of the caller when 
they went to the motel. Although the caller appears to have been Mr. Corwell's husband, 
the record does not indicate when the police learned this information. In fact, Detective 
Anderson testified at a suppression hearing that he could not remember the dispatch 
report including the caller's identity when he responded to the motel. R. 99: 3, 9, 13. 
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Based on the lack of evidence, the trial court found that the caller was "anonymous." R. 
99: 24. 
Detectives Anderson and Ita went to the motel room to perform strictly a "knock 
and talk." R. 3. A knock and talk involves the police approaching a residence without a 
warrant to see if the occupants are willing to cooperate with the police. Both detectives 
were in plain clothes. R. 99: 11. 
Detective Ita knocked on the door and Ms. Champneys inquired, from behind the 
door, who was knocking. R. 40. Detective Ita responded, "Tracy." R. 99: 3. Ms. 
Champneys asked again who had knocked on the door. R. 99: 4. Detective Ita identified 
himself again as "Tracy" and added that he was a police detective. R. 99: 4. Ms. 
Champneys demanded to see a police badge which Detective Ita presented through the 
peep hole and Detective Anderson presented through the window leading into the room. 
R. 99: 4. Detective Anderson testified that there was a gap between the window curtains 
where he could show his badge and see into the room. R. 99: 4. 
As Detective Anderson looked through the window, he informed Ms. Champneys 
that the police were looking for a woman named Liza. R. 99: 5. Ms. Champneys stated 
through the closed door that she was alone in the room. R. 99: 5. At that point, 
Detective Anderson looked through the window and saw another woman in the room 
putting a "metallic" object into a purse. R. 99: 6, 12. Det. Anderson stated that he 
"thought" the object was the "right shape and size of a crack pipe." R. 99: 6, 12. Ms. 
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Champneys then acknowledged that the other woman in the room was Liza Corwell. R. 
99: 5. 
When Detective Anderson informed Detective James Tracy what he had observed, 
Detective Tracy went to the motel manager's office for a key to the room. R. 99: 7. 
While Detective Tracy retrieved the key, Detective Anderson continued to talk to Ms. 
Champneys and asked her to open the door. R. 99: 7-8. Ms. Champneys refused, 
however, to allow the police to enter. R. 99: 8. Detective Anderson then observed the 
two women hiding things under and behind the bed, including the purse that contained 
the metal object. R. 99: 7. The women also went in and out of the bathroom two to four 
times each. R. 99: 4, 7. In Det Anderson's experience, drug users are known to flush 
drugs down a toilet or sink, especially, in motel rooms, to avoid detection. R. 99: 7. 
Detective Tracy returned with the room key and opened the door. R. 99: 8. The 
door only opened a few inches because it was secured from the inside by a security latch. 
R. 99: 8. The police again demanded that Ms. Champneys unlock the door but she 
refused. R. 99: 8. When Detective Tracy kicked at the door, Ms. Champneys offered to 
open the door halfway. R. 99: 8. Without responding to this offer, Detective Tracy 
kicked the door completely open and the detectives entered the room. R. 99: 8. 
Detective Anderson immediately arrested Ms. Champneys while the other 
detectives restrained Ms. Corwell. R. 4. Officer Patty Roberts searched Ms. Corwell and 
found a crack pipe, Brillo pads, and a pill bottle that contained cocaine. R. 4. When 
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Officer Roberts attempted to take the pill bottle into custody, Ms. Corwell unsuccessfully 
tried to grab the bottle from her. R. 4. 
The police also searched Ms. Corwell's purse and found a spoon with cocaine 
residue on it but found no pipe. R. 99: 12. Detective Anderson admitted that during his 
observations through the window he never saw the women possessing any drugs, he 
smelled nothing, and he heard no water running, including the flushing of toilets. R. 99: 
7, 12. 
The State charged Ms. Corwell and Ms. Champneys with one count each of 
tampering with evidence, unlawful possession of a controlled substance, and unlawful 
possession of drug paraphernalia. R. 2-3. Ms. Corwell joined in Ms. Champneys' 
motion to suppress the evidence the police obtained from the warrantless search of her 
motel room. R. 49. The State opposed the motion. R. 39. The trial judge denied the 
motion and concluded that there was probable cause of a crime and that the police 
reasonably believed that the defendants were concealing and destroying evidence. R. 65; 
99: 24-26. 
On December 7, 2001, Ms. Corwell agreed to plead guilty to one count each of 
attempting to tamper with evidence and attempted forgery. R. 56. In exchange for the 
plea, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges and to allow Ms. Corwell to 
challenge the denial of her motion to suppress on appeal. R. 56; 100: 2-4. 
As part of the agreement, Ms. Corwell had reviewed with trial counsel a statement 
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of the rights she was waiving by pleading guilty. R. 56. These rights included the right 
to a jury trial, the right to appeal, and the appointment of appellate counsel. R. 58-59. 
The statement provided that Ms. Corwell had reviewed the statement with counsel, 
understood the statement, and willingly agreed to plead guilty. R. 60-61. 
The trial judge conducted a joint plea colloquy with Ms. Corwell and Ms. 
Champneys, who had also agreed to plead guilty. R. 100. The attorneys for both 
defendants indicated that they had reviewed the plea statements with their clients and 
they believed that the defendants understood the agreements. R. 100: 4. Counsel for Ms. 
Corwell added that Ms. Corwell had pleaded guilty based on State v. Sery. 758 P.2d 935 
(Utah 1988). R. 100: 4. The trial judge explained, "so everybody is clear on that," Sery 
meant that Ms. Corwell could "appeal it." R. 100: 4. Both defendants confirmed that 
they had reviewed the statements with their attorneys, had sufficient time to consider the 
agreements, and understood their decisions to plead guilty. R. 100: 5. 
The trial judge then reviewed several rights that the defendants were waiving and 
asked each of the women if they understood these rights. R. 100: 7. The trial judge first 
mentioned that the defendants were waiving their right to a trial which was scheduled for 
the following Monday. R. 100: 7. The hearing took place on the preceding Friday. R. 
149. Both defendants nodded affirmatively to waive this right. R. 100: 7. 
The trial judge then discussed the rights to testify, remain silent, confront and 
cross-examine witnesses, be presumed innocent, require the State to prove guilt beyond a 
11 
reasonable doubt, and an unanimous jury verdict. R. 100: 8-10. Both defendants 
indicated that they understood these rights and wanted to waive them. R. 100: 8-12. 
They represented further that they had no questions about their rights or their decision to 
plead guilty. R. 100: 12. The trial judge did not mention the rights to a speedy public 
trial or the limits on the right to an appeal. After reviewing the factual basis for the 
charges, the potential penalties, and the elements of the offense, the trial judge accepted 
the defendants' guilty pleas. R. 100: 10, 13-15. 
The trial court sentenced Ms. Corwell to a term of up to five years imprisonment 
but suspended that term and placed her on probation for 24 months. R. 68-69. The 
judge also imposed a fine but suspended part of it, ordered Ms. Corwell to pay $350 
toward the cost of her court-appointed attorney, required her to enroll in a drug treatment 
program, and imposed 75 hours of community service. R. 68-69. Ms. Corwell then filed 
a timely notice of appeal. R. 75. 
Three days after filing her appeal of notice, Ms. Corwell filed a motion to vacate 
her conviction and to withdraw her guilty plea. R. 84. She argued that she did not 
knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty because the trial judge failed to advise her of her 
right to a speedy public trial, limited appeal rights, and other requirements found in Rule 
11(e). R. 122. The State opposed the motion and argued that the trial judge's plea 
canvass sufficiently complied with Rule 11(e). R. 145-49. 
In the meantime, this Court assumed jurisdiction over this case based on the filing 
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of the notice of appeal. On June 14, 2002, this Court remanded this case to the trial court 
to consider Ms. Cornell's request to withdraw her guilty plea. R. 156. The trial judge 
conducted a hearing on the motion on June 21, 2002. R. 182. He concluded that, with 
the exception of the right to a speedy public trial, all of Rule 11's requirements were 
included in either Ms. Corwell's written plea statement or in the trial judge's oral plea 
canvass. R. 182: 5. Moreover, because the plea hearing occurred on a Friday and trial 
was set for the following Monday, the judge ruled that Ms. Corwell had knowledge of 
her right to a speedy public trial. R. 182: 5. 
The trial judge entered a written order denying the motion on October 11, 2002. 
R. 177. In it, he ruled that because he had "substantially" complied with "most" of Rule 
1 lfs requirements, Ms. Corwell had voluntarily entered her plea. R. 178. Ms. Corwell 
filed an amended notice of appeal on October 28, 2002. Addendum B. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The police violated Ms. Corwell' right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures when they forcibly entered her motel room and arrested her without a warrant. 
The police may search a residence without a warrant if they have probable cause of a 
crime and if exigent circumstances require immediate police action. But, here, the police 
lacked probable cause to search the room based on an anonymous tip and relying on their 
minimal personal observations. 
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Similarly, the police lacked exigent circumstances to enter the motel room. The 
State failed to meet its weighty burden of proving that the women in the room were 
destroying evidence. The police saw no drugs, smelled no odors, and heard no sounds 
that indicated that the women were flushing drugs down the toilet or sink. The absence 
of evidence justifying a warrantless search rendered the search and arrest illegal. 
Reversal is also required because the trial judge failed to adhere to Rule 11(e) in 
accepting Ms. Cornell's guilty plea. Trial judges have a duty to strictly comply with 
Rule 11(e). Here, neither Ms. Cornell's plea statement nor the trial judge mentioned her 
right to a speedy public trial or the limits that a guilty plea places on the right to appeal. 
The fact that Ms. Cornell's trial was scheduled to begin the Monday following her plea 
colloquy did not excuse the trial judge from explaining the distinct right to a speedy 
public trial and did not in any way address the limits on Ms. Cornell's right to appeal. 
The trial judge's failure to ensure that Ms. Corwell understood her rights required the 
trial judge to withdraw the guilty plea. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. BECAUSE THE POLICE LACKED PROBABLE CAUSE 
AND EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES, THEY 
CONDUCTED AN ILLEGAL, WARRANTLESS SEARCH 
AND ARREST. 
The warrantless search and arrest of Ms. Corwell violated her state and federal 
constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. "[S]earches 
conducted without a warrant 'are per se unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated 
exceptions/" State v. Ashe. 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987) (quoting Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (emphasis in original)). The exception at issue here 
required the State to establish "probable cause and exigent circumstances." City of Orem 
v. Henrie. 868 P.2d 1384, 1388 (Utah Ct App. 1994). 
In finding exceptions to the warrant requirement, "[t]he State bears [a] particularly 
heavy burden" of persuasion. State v. Beavers. 859 P.2d 9, 13 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
"[Ejxceptions are 'jealously and carefully drawn,' and there must be a 'showing by those 
who seek exemption . .. that the exigencies of the situation made [the search] 
imperative."' Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1258 (quoting Collidge v. New Hampshire. 403 U.S. 
443, 455 (1971) (plurality opinion) (internal quotations omitted)). Because the police 
failed to sufficiently corroborate the anonymous report of drug activity, they lacked both 
probable cause and exigent circumstances necessary to conduct a warrantless search. 
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A. Without Substantial Corroborating Evidence, 
The Anonymous Tip Failed to Establish 
Probable Cause. 
The ambiguous police observations coupled with the failure of the police to 
corroborate the tip failed to provide probable cause of a crime. When "the State 
predicates its probable cause argument upon information received from an informant, 
'[this Court] must examine the "totality of the circumstances" to determine whether the 
informant's tip, together with police observations, provided probable cause to arrest'" the 
defendant. State v. Valenzuela. 2001 UT App 332,1f 11, 37 P.3d 260 (quoting State v. 
Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1233 (Utah 1996), quoting Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213, 
238 (1983)). "This inquiry involves 'a practical, common-sense decision whether, given 
all the circumstances . . ., including the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of persons 
supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that . . . evidence of a crime will 
be found '" Anderson. 910 P.2d at 1233 (quoting Gates. 462 U.S. at 238). 
This Court considers three factors in determining whether probable cause supports 
an arrest based on an informant's tip: 
Our first focus is upon "the type of tip or informant involved," 
[Kavsville City v. Mulcahv, 943 P.2d 231, 234 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997)], granting identified informants substantially more 
credibility than anonymous informants. See kl Next, we 
examine "whether the informant gave enough detail about the 
observed criminal activity to support a [seizure]," and 
concluded that "[a] tip is more reliable if it is apparent that the 
informant observed the details personally, instead of relaying 
information from a third party." IdL at 236. Finally, we examine 
"whether the police officer's personal observations confirm the 
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dispatcher's report of the informant's tip," noting that an officer 
can corroborate the information '"either by observing the illegal 
activity[,] or by finding the person, [and the other material facts] 
substantially as described by the informant.'" Id (citation 
omitted). Moreover, while we stated that '"[w]here the 
reliability of the information is increased, less corroboration is 
necessary,"' id (alteration in original) (citation omitted), we 
also established that absent a risk to public safety we expect 
police officers to make significant independent corroborative 
efforts to confirm the information. See id. 
Valenzuela. 2001 UT App 332, fll5, 37 P.3d 260. 
Considering these factors, the police lacked probable cause of criminal activity. 
First, c"[b]ecause an anonymous caller's basis of knowledge and veracity are typically 
unknown/ anonymous tips are toward 'the low-end of the reliability scale/" Mulcahy, 
943 P.2d at 235 (quoting State v. Evans, 692 So. 2d 216, 218 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)). 
At the time the police knocked on Ms. Cornell's motel door, they only knew that an 
anonymous caller claimed that Ms. Corwell and another woman may be selling drugs in 
the room. See Florida v. J.L.. 529 U.S. 266, 271 (2000) (reasonable suspicion based on 
police officer's knowledge at the time of a search). Absent some "'indicia of 
reliability,'" an anonymous tip fails to provide the police probable cause to search or 
arrest a person. JLL, 529 U.S. at 270 (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 
(1990)). Here, the police had no indication about the reliability of the anonymous 
source. 
Second, the anonymous caller did not provide much detail or state that he had 
"observed the details personally." Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 236. In fact, the caller indicated 
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that he lacked personal knowledge of the activities in the motel room. Specifically, he 
claimed that Liza Corwell was with another woman in a motel room and they might be 
selling drugs. The caller's inability to specify what was occurring in the room suggests 
that he had not personally witnessed any illegal drug usage in the room. Thus, it appears 
that the caller lacked first-hand knowledge of the situation. Id. 
Third, the police made no "significant independent corroborative efforts to 
confirm the information." Valenzuela. 2001 UT App 332,1fl5, 37 P.3d 260. The police 
admitted that they never attempted to stake out the motel room to determine whether 
anyone was frequenting the room. R. 99: 9. Likewise, the police failed to even contact 
the motel manager before knocking on the door to confirm whether Ms. Corwell had 
rented a room or whether any suspicious activity had occurred there. R. 99: 9-10. In 
fact, the police made no effort to corroborate the tip, at all, before knocking on the door. 
R. 99: 9-10. Rather tl I verifying the anonymous tip, it appears the police hoped either 
to gain the occupants' consent to enter the room or to just test their luck and knock on 
the door. The fact that the police performed a knock and talk shows that they believed 
themselves that they lacked probable cause to obtain a search warrant. 
Admittedly, the police did confirm that Ms. Corwell was in the room. But, in 
determining the reliability of a tip, the information must "be reliable in its assertion of 
illegal[] [activity], not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person." JUL, 529 
U.S. at 272: see also State v. Case. 884 P.2d 1274, 1278 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Without 
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confirming the existence of drug activity, the police lacked probable cause. 
The only indication even hinting at drug usage was Det. Anderson's claim that he 
saw Ms. Crowell place a "metallic" object into her purse which he "thought" was the 
"right shape and size of a crack pipe." R. 99: 6, 12. Det. Anderson's observations 
merely amounted to a suspicion of drug activity. Of most importance, Det. Anderson 
was mistaken in his belief that the metal object was a pipe. Moreover, despite his 
attempts to make his description as definite as he could, he was only able to state that he 
"thought" the object was a crack pipe. R. 99: 6, 12. This vague assertion coupled with 
Det. Anderson's inaccurate observations do not constitute "a fair probability that. . . 
evidence of a crime w[ould] be found... .'" Anderson, 910 P.2d at 1233 (quoting Gates, 
462 U.S. at 238). 
Likewise, the women's movements after the police announced their presence were 
nothing more than questionable activity rather than probable cause. Although the women 
were obviously scurrying and tidying up the room, the police saw the women engaging in 
no illegal activity. The police specifically stated that they saw no evidence that the 
women possessed or hid drugs. The police saw nothing in the women's hands, detected 
no smells, and heard no noises indicating that the women were using drugs. 
The police officers' failure to investigate the anonymous tip and their ambiguous 
observations of the women hardly constituted "significant independent corroborative 
efforts to confirm the information." Valenzuela. 2001 UT App 336, ^15, 37 P.3d 260. 
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Although the police may have had a suspicion of criminal activity, they lacked probable 
cause of a crime. 
B. The Suspects5 Ambiguous Actions Failed to 
Support that They Were Destroying Drugs, 
For similar reasons, the State failed to meet its "heavy burden" of establishing 
exigent circumstances to support the warrantless search. Beavers, 859 P.2d at 13. 
"Exigent circumstances are those 'that would cause a reasonable person to believe that 
entry . . . was necessary to prevent physical harm to the officers or other persons, the 
destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of the suspect, or some other consequence 
improperly frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts.5" Id at 18 (quoting United 
States v. McConnev. 728 F.2d 1195, 1199 (9th Cir.), cert, denied. 469 U.S. 824 (1984)). 
On appeal, this Court must "review the totality of the facts and circumstances of the 
particular case to determine if the finding of exigency was proper." Ashe, 745 P.2d at 
1258. 
Here, the State failed to present sufficient facts supporting an immediate need to 
search the motel room to prevent the destruction of evidence. Det. Anderson conceded 
that other than his erroneous belief that the spoon was a crack pipe, he saw no other 
evidence of drugs in the room. As noted above, the police saw the women holding 
nothing suspicious in their hands, there was no evidence that drugs were being used in 
the room, and the police heard no noises that would suggest the destruction of evidence 
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such as the flushing of toilets or running water. Rather, the police only had a generalized 
concern that drug offenders are known to destroy evidence to prevent detection. To 
conduct a warrantless search, the police must have "particularized suspicion" as opposed 
to concerns for or knowledge of criminal behavior generally. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 
U.S. 119, 124(2000). 
The State failed to meet its weighty burden of showing that the women were 
destroying evidence. The women's tidying up and trips into the bathroom do not 
necessarily suggest that they were destroying evidence. These actions could have been 
wholly innocent such as cleaning the room or putting away personal or intimate items. 
Absent more definite indications that evidence was being destroyed, the police 
violated Ms. CorwelFs rights when they forcibly entered her motel room. A person's 
privacy interests in a motel room is on par with one's home. Lanza v. New York, 370 
U.S. 139, 143-44(1962). Accordingly, "'[t]he need for an immediate search must be 
apparent to the police, and so strong as to outweigh the important protection of 
individual rights provided by the warrant requirement.'" Beavers, 859 P.2d at 18 
(quoting United States v. Robertson, 606 F.2d 853, 859 (9th Cir. 1979)). Given the 
sacred nature of the right to privacy in a dwelling and the ambiguity of the women's 
actions, the State failed to establish that a reasonable person "'would'" have concluded 
that the women were, in fact, destroying evidence. Icl (quoting McConney, 728 F.2d at 
1199). 
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II. THE TRIAL JUDGE'S FAILURE TO INFORM MS. 
CORWELL OF HER CONSTITUTIONALLY-
PROTECTED RIGHTS REQUIRED WITHDRAWAL OF 
HER GUILTY PLEA. 
Utah appellate courts have entrusted trial judges with the duty to strictly adhere to 
Rule 11(e) in accepting guilty pleas. Strict compliance ensures that guilty-pleading 
defendants only give up fundamental statutory and constitutional rights knowingly and 
voluntarily . Here, Ms. Corwell's plea statement did not mention nor did the trial judge 
query Ms. Corwell about her right to a speedy public trial or the limits on the right to 
appeal. Because Ms. Corwell did not knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty, the trial 
judge erred in refusing to withdraw her guilty plea. 
The trial judge shirked his duty to determine whether Ms. Corwell understood the 
rights that she waived by pleading guilty. Rule 11(e) "squarely places on trial courts the 
burden of ensuring that constitutional and Rule 11(e) requirements are complied with 
when a guilty plea is entered." State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987). This 
duty requires "strict compliance" with the rule. State v. Abevta. 852 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 
1993). This means "'that the trial court [must] personally establish that the defendant's 
guilty plea is truly knowing and voluntary and establish on the record that the defendant 
knowingly waived his or her constitutional rights.'" State v. Vissen 2000 UT 88, ^[11, 22 
P.3d 1242 (quoting Abevta. 852 P.2d at 995 (emphasis in original)). 
"Strict compliance, however, does not mandate a particular script or rote recitation 
of the rights listed." Id Rather, the key is whether the trial court informed the defendant 
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of those rights and the defendant understood them. IdL at {^13. In determining whether 
the trial court has carried out this duty, this Court looks to the entire record including the 
oral plea canvass and any written statements by the defendant. Id at f 12. But, trial 
courts must ensure that "'no requirement of the rule is omitted.'" IdL (quoting State v. 
Maguire, 830 P.2d 216, 218 (Utah 1991)). 
Here, the trial judge omitted several constitutional rights in accepting Ms. 
CorwelFs guilty plea. Most prominently, neither the plea statement nor the trial judge 
ever mentioned the right to a "speedy public trial" as required under Rule 11(e)(3). On 
several recent occasions, this Court has concluded that a trial judge's failure to inform 
guilty-pleading defendants of that right requires withdrawal of a guilty plea. In State v. 
Hittle. 2002 UT App 134, f6, 47 P.3d 101, for example, the trial judge failed to inform 
the defendant of the right to a speedy public trial in either the plea statement or during 
the plea canvass. This Court ruled that this omission constituted plain error because the 
right to a speedy public trial was "a distinct right of criminal defendants, separate from 
the right to a trial before an impartial jury." IdL at f 8. This Court reasoned that "[i]f the 
defendant is not fully informed of his [or her] rights prior to pleading guilty, then the 
guilty plea cannot be voluntary." Id. at [^10. 
Likewise, in State v. Tarnawiecki. 2000 UT App 186, f4, 5 P.3d 1222, the trial 
judge similarly failed to inform the defendant of the right to a speedy public trial in the 
plea statement or during the plea colloquy. This Court vacated the conviction based on 
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the trial judge's omission. Id at ^21. According to the panel, the strict compliance 
doctrine does not address "the quantum of error" but, rather, whether the trial judge 
informs the defendant of the rights waived under a guilty plea. Id at ^ 19. When 
accepting a guilty plea, "strict compliance, rather than substantial compliance" is 
required under Rule 11(e). Id at f 12 (emphasis in original); see also State v. Valencia, 
776 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("Strict, and not just substantial, compliance 
with the rule is required."). 
Here, the trial judge conceded in his order denying the motion to withdraw that he 
only covered "most" of the Rule 11(e) requirements and that he "substantially" complied 
with Rule 11(e). R. 178. But, as this Court ruled in Tarnawiecki, under the strict 
compliance doctrine, the number of rights omitted does not matter. 2000 UT App 186, 
1f 19, 5 P.3d 1222. Because each right is "distinct" and equally important, the trial judge 
must inform the defendant of each right. Hittle. 2002 UT App 134,1(8, 47 P.3d 101. 
The trial judge's omission of the right to a speedy public trial requires withdrawal of Ms. 
Cornell's guilty plea. Id at f 10; Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 186,1J21, 5 P.3d 1222; 
Visser, 2000 UT 88, %l 1, 22 P.3d 1242. 
The trial judge also failed to inform Ms. Corwell that her guilty plea limited her 
right to appeal. Rule 11(e) requires trial judges to advise guilty-pleading defendants "that 
the right of appeal is limited." Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(8). Specifically, "by pleading 
guilty [or no contest], the defendant is deemed to have admitted all of the essential 
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elements of the crime charged and thereby waives all nonjurisdictional defects. . . ." State 
v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Utah 1989). Defendants may also appeal from a guilty 
plea if they enter the plea contingent on the right to raise an issue, as was done in this 
case, contest the sentence imposed, or challenge the voluntariness of the plea. Id,; State 
v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah 1988). 
Ms. Cornell's plea statement makes no mention of the effect a guilty plea has on 
the right to appeal. Similarly, the trial judge failed to mention any limits on this right at 
the plea hearing. Instead, both the plea statement and the trial judge merely informed 
Ms. Corwell that she could appeal the denial of her motion to suppress. The trial judge 
failed, however, to determine whether Ms. Corwell understood that by pleading guilty 
she was waiving her right to challenge all other nonjurisdictional issues on appeal. Just 
as a jury trial is a separate and distinct right from a speedy public trial, the limits on an 
appeal are separate from the right to appeal generally. Hittle, 2002 UT App 134, ^ [6, 47 
P.3d 101. The trial judge's failure to make this distinction violates Rule 1 l(e)'s strict 
compliance standard. State v. Ostler. 2000 UT App 28, f 16, 996 P.2d 1065, affirmed on 
other grounds. 2001 UT 68, 31 P.3d 528. 
The trial judge concluded below that his failure to mention the right to a speedy 
public trial did not violate Rule 11(e) because Ms. Corwell was aware of this right. 
Specifically, the judge concluded that because Ms. Corwell pleaded guilty on the Friday 
before her trial, which was scheduled to begin the following Monday, she understood her 
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right to a speedy public trial. Even accepting the trial judge's reasoning, the trial judge's 
decision overlooks his failure to inform Ms. Corwell that her right to appeal was limited. 
This omission alone requires withdrawal of her guilty plea. As this Court ruled in 
Tarnawiecki, "the quantum of error" is irrelevant; rather, strict compliance requires 
reversal because the trial court entirely failed to inform Ms. Corwell of one of her 
constitutionally protected rights. 2000 UT App 186, [^19, 5 P.3d 1222. In Ostler, this 
Court specifically applied this conclusion to the failure to explain the limits on appeal. 
2000 UT App 28, If 16, 996 P.2d 1065. 
In any event, the application of the strict compliance doctrine defeats the trial 
judge's decision. Only one Utah case has ever excused the trial court's complete 
omission of a Rule 11(e) requirement. In Visser, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that 
because the defendant pleaded guilty in the middle of his jury trial and had participated 
injury selection, he understood that he had a right to a speedy public trial before an 
impartial jury. 2000 UT 88,1ffll5-l6, 22 P.3d 1242. The Supreme Court reasoned that 
"in light of the mid-trial context of the plea." the trial court's failure to inform the 
defendant of those rights satisfied the strict compliance requirement. Id. at^|13 
(emphasis added). 
This Court recently ruled, however, that Visser is limited to its specific facts. In 
State v. Dean, 2002 UT App 323, If 1, 457 Utah Adv. Rep. 11, the defendant pleaded 
guilty prior to trial. In accepting the guilty plea, the trial judge failed to inform the 
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defendant of the right to a speedy public trial by an impartial jury. Id These rights were 
also not included in the written plea statement. Id The State argued that Visser excused 
these omissions. Id at If 10 n.2. This Court disagreed and concluded that "nothing in the 
record suggests the trial court established that Dean knowingly waived" these rights. Id 
This Court distinguished Visser because the defendant in that case entered his plea after 
he "had already received the benefit of his speedy trial right" and because his 
participation in the jury selection showed that he understood his right to an impartial 
jury. Id at ^ [12 n.3. In contrast, "Dean's trial had not yet begun, and the jury had not yet 
been selected." Id 
Likewise, in this case, Ms. Corwell pleaded guilty before trial. Thus, just as in 
Dean, she was never afforded her right to a speedy public trial. The fact that Ms. 
Corwell pleaded guilty on the Friday before her trial which was scheduled to begin the 
following Monday is not analogous to the mid-trial plea in Visser. Because Ms. Corwell 
was never afforded her right to a speedy public trial, this Court cannot presume that Ms. 
Corwell understood this right. To the contrary, "[i]f the defendant is not fully informed 
of his [or her] rights prior to pleading guilty, then the guilty plea cannot be voluntary." 
ffittle, 2002 UT App 134, ^ 10, 47 P.3d 101. Because the trial judge never informed Ms. 
Corwell of her right to a speedy public trial and she never received that right, her guilty 
plea was involuntary. Id 
The policy behind the strict compliance doctrine supports this conclusion. In first 
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announcing the strict compliance standard, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that 
informing guilty-pleading defendants of all of Rule 11(e)'s requirements would place 
additional burdens on trial judges. Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1314. Nevertheless, the 
Supreme Court unequivocally concluded that "constitutional rights may not be sacrificed 
in the name of judicial economy." Id Thus, the trial judge's conclusion that he 
"substantially" complied with "most" of Rule 1 l(e)'s dictates has no relevance under the 
strict compliance doctrine. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the police lacked probable cause and exigent circumstances, Ms. Corwell 
requests this Court to reverse the trial court's denial of her motion to suppress. 
Moreover, the trial judge's failure to inform Ms. Corwell of her right to a speedy public 
trial and the limits on her right to appeal require withdrawal of her guilty plea. 
Submitted this A*]*** day of November, 2002. 
KENT R. HART 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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CHARGES 
1. ATTEMPTED TAMPER WITH EVIDENCE - 3rd Degree Felony 
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SENTENCE, JUDGMENT and COMMITMENT 
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The defendant's probation is revoked. 
The defendant's probation is reinstated for 36 months beginning May 
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Additionally the court Orders defendant serve 6 months in the Salt 
Lake County Jail. 
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